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The authors use a composite case based on their experiences to illustrate the ethics of inter-professional
conﬂict. An HDU team receive two telephone calls. One is from the patient’s cardiologist, who states that
a patient must be anti-coagulated without delay. The other is from the surgeon responsible for the
patient’s current admission, who states that the patient must under no circumstances be anti-coagulated.
We argue that in the absence of a broad understanding of the patient’s condition and values, specialists
should be cautious when giving categorical orders or, at the very least, should provide the rationale for
their advice to help the care leader in his or her decision-making
 2009 Surgical Associates Ltd. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.The following case is a composite case based on the authors’
experiences.
A 60-year-old man is admitted to the high dependency unit with
a retroperitoneal haematoma after an emergency hernia repair. He
has been on warfarin for mechanical heart valves.
The HDU team receives two telephone calls. One is from the
patient’s cardiologist, who states that this patient is at high risk of
stroke and must be anti-coagulated without delay. The other is
from the surgeon responsible for the patient’s current admission,
who states that the patient must under no circumstances be anti-
coagulated at present. The risk of a retroperitoneal haemorrhage is
too great. The patient, who is awake and lucid, has expressed his
conﬁdence in ‘the hospital doctors’ and will do whatever they
decide is best for him.
In the military context, the most senior ofﬁcer in the chain of
command holds the ultimate authority for a decision. The case
above reveals that, in medicine, the situation is not so clear-cut. It is
not always obvious who has the decision-making authority. WhoPapanikitas).
ciates Ltd. Published by Elsevier Lt‘owns’ the patient in this case? Should one specialist assume
a leadership role, and if so should it be the surgeon, the HDU
consultant, the cardiologist or even a haematologist? Are the care
leader’s decisions ﬁnal, or can they be questioned or counter-
manded by other members of a multidisciplinary team? And can
the patient abdicate responsibility by placing his trust in the
judgement of the clinicians?
This case illustrates a failure of communication and an excessive
narrowness of focus. Specialists, understandably perhaps, fall foul
of an aphorism attributed to Abraham Maslow, who said in 1962,
‘‘When the only tool you have is a hammer, it is tempting to treat
everything as if it were a nail.’’1 The specialists run the risk of
viewing the patient only in terms of the problem they treat. Armed
with their hammers, the two specialists give conﬂicting orders
which they expect the HDU team to follow. The basis for the
decisions has not been adequately explained to the attending
doctors or the patient.
Although the patient is deferential, there is a strong autonomy-
based argument for offering to explain the situation to him and,
with his permission, to his family. The medical team can explain to
the patient that there are several possible options, each with their
own beneﬁts and risks, and that since there is no evidently best
option he can help the team decide which option best matches hisd. All rights reserved.
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outcome. Whatever the course of action, the HDU teamwill have to
face the patient and the relatives in the event of an adverse
outcome. Involving them in the decision-making process, in addi-
tion to the beneﬁts they may bring to the process and the sense of
empowerment they may experience from the shared decision-
making, reduces the likelihood of complaints. We strongly believe,
however, that the patient should not simply be presented with the
facts and asked to make a decision, but that he should be helped by
the medical team to interpret the information and make a well
thought-out decision. In such circumstances, clinicians have a duty
to enhance the autonomy of the patient by careful explanations
that match the abilities and informational preferences of the
particular patient. This may be challenging in situations where time
is short, but time spent at this early stage may prevent many
unpleasant hours spent in the future. A number of studies have
found that the majority of patients want to be more involved in
their care and that enhanced autonomy leads to better health
outcomes. These are used to support the argument that pater-
nalism is no longer a sustainable normality,2 though these has been
some debate as to whether all patients want to accept responsi-
bility for their healthcare decisions.3
The HDU team are in a Catch-22 situation. A recent consensus
document of UK medical bodies states that doctors ‘‘must be
capable of regularly taking ultimate responsibility for difﬁcult
decisions in situations of clinical complexity and uncertainty.’’4 All
the consultants are therefore expected to be accountable. If the
HDU team anti-coagulate the patient and he dies of a bleed,
a furious surgeon will ask why they did not follow his crystal clear
instructions. If they do not anti-coagulate the patient and he has
a stroke, an irate cardiologist may criticise their management on
the same grounds. It is impossible to obey two contradictory orders,
but even in normal circumstances ‘only obeying orders’ is not an
adequate defence from professional criticism. Doctors should act in
the best interests of their patients and it is accepted that this may
mean overriding the recommendations of a specialist.5 In this case,
obtaining a consensus among the clinicians and the patient,
however inconvenient or difﬁcult it may seem, may avoid later
recrimination and allow the attending doctors to work with more
peace of mind.
The HDU consultant asks the cardiologist and surgeon to talk to
each other. The cardiologist is happy for the surgeon to call him. The
surgeon does not believe it is necessary to involve the cardiologist.
Unhappy with conﬂicting advice the HDU team seek the advice of
the on-call haematologist. The haematologist suggests that the
HDU team compare risk of bleeding against the percentage risk of
stroke if the patient is off warfarin for 3–4 days. The haematologist
suggests dividing the annual percentage risk by 365 and multi-
plying it by 4 to produce this ﬁgure.
Is this a simple case of comparing risks? Once again, the hae-
matologist is considering one aspect of the patient: the patient’s
clotting. Which is the worse outcome, a clot or a bleed? Both may
kill or severely disable the patient. If one had to make a choice
between a low risk of a terrible consequence and a higher risk of
a not-so-terrible consequence, which would one choose? The
patient’s views on the balance of risks and beneﬁts need to be
ascertained. Such views are hard to quantify in the manner of the
percentage risk of stroke. To obtain valid consent for whatever
intervention is ultimately chosen, the clinician must go through the
PARQA acronym with the patient: P stands for procedure (explain
what the procedure or treatment involves), A for alternatives (what
are the reasonable alternatives to the proposed treatment), R for
risks (what are the risks and beneﬁts of the treatment and the
alternatives), Q for questions (invite the patient to ask questions)and, for higher risk interventions, A is for advance care planning
(discuss with the patient the possibility of writing an advance
statement or appointing a Lasting Power of Attorney in case the
patient should lose the capacity to make decisions).6
Perhaps this should not be considered a choice between two
evils, but between two courses of action each with its own beneﬁts,
burdens, and side effects. Medical schools tend to teach students
that there is a right decision and many wrong decisions. In reality,
when principles and codes are too crude to guide action in speciﬁc
circumstances and thus require judgement and interpretation, the
conclusion of our careful deliberation may be that there is no single
right decision but several clinically and morally defensible options.
The ‘orders’ given by the cardiologist at the outset of the case are
given in absolute terms. However, the ‘right’ decision for a specialist
may be right when seen through the lens of the specialist, but may
not be right when seen from the vantage point of the HDU physi-
cian, who may perceive his clinical scope exceeding that of the
specialist.7 In the absence of a broad understanding of the patient’s
condition and values, specialists should be cautious when giving
categorical orders or, at the very least, should provide the rationale
for their advice to help the care leader in his or her decision-
making.
The information given by the haematologist seemsmore helpful
than the ‘orders’ of the other specialists. However, as doctors have
reminded each other for centuries, it is perilous to divide the
patient into diseased organs or systems without keeping an eye on
the patient as a whole, such as in the case of our patient whose
values should help determine clinical management.8 This call for
a broader perspective holds true even on clinical grounds. For
example, what other risk factors for strokes does the patient have?
In sum, clinical and ethical principles must be interpreted in
context to provide meaningful guidance that is sensitive to the
nuances of the individual case.1. Conclusion
The patient is not anti-coagulated. The decision is explained to the
patient and to the cardiologist by the HDU consultant. He does well
and is discharged from HDU. The HDU registrar is left wondering
what would have happened if they had anti-coagulated the patient.
The authors have come across several such cases (AP has dis-
cussed other aspects of interdisciplinary interaction in this jour-
nal).9–11 These cases do not necessarily reﬂect poor management
from the patient’s viewpoint (the patient may be blissfully unaware
of such bedside disputes), but a perennial problem with inter-
professional communication and understanding. It is difﬁcult to
pinpoint the cause of this problem, but one plausible explanation is
that clinicians lack understanding of specialities other than their
own, in particular the lens through which they conceptualise
patients and their illness, which may in turn lead to a lack of inter-
speciality respect.11 The increasingly rapid specialisation of doctors
after qualiﬁcation does not foster inter-speciality understanding.
The perceived pig-headedness of other specialities, whether
general practitioners, neurosurgeons, anaesthetists, radiologists, or
any other speciality, must be a commonmoan in themeeting rooms
and corridors of hospitals across the world. In the case above, it is
noteworthy that, although the cardiologist was willing to discuss
the situation with the surgeon, the surgeon believed cardiology
involvement was unnecessary. This apparent arrogance, especially
if the HDU doctor at the other end of the phone is inexperienced
and impressionable, can adversely affect patient care by preventing
a potentially beneﬁcial cardiology assessment.
Our case illustrates that interpreting risk is as much about
understanding the patient’s values as about calculating odds, and
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(as long, of course, as he is able and willing to contribute to the
process), especially when the risks and beneﬁts appear ﬁnely
balanced. Some doctors, however, immersed in clinical facts and
ﬁgures, may overlook the ethical or values-based dimension to
a clinical decision. To address this, the UK’s Royal College of General
Practice highlights the ethical aspects of every clinical decision in
their core curriculum for GPs in training.12
At the end of this case some readersmay be left wonderingwhat
the fuss was all about. Surely the surgeon was in charge. Surely
there was only one correct course of action. Surely better
communication was the answer and there was no real controversy.
Surely the decision should have been the patient’s alone. Such
attitudes, while comforting in their simplicity, ignore the complex
interplay between the values and power relations of patients,
relatives and clinicians and the unique contextual features, clinical
and non-clinical, of cases in decision-making. The turf wars
between specialities, which in our experience are relatively
common, suggest that the issue of ‘who owns the case?’ still needs
to be addressed by the medical profession. The issue is not merely
a matter of inter-professional respect but has signiﬁcant implica-
tions for patient care.
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